Yeh, Shen, and Hwang recently proposed a secure onetime password authentication scheme using smart cards. They modified the famous S/KEY scheme to achieve security against preplay attacks and off-line dictionary attacks. However, this article shows that their scheme is vulnerable to preplay attacks.
Introduction
The well-known S/KEY one-time password scheme was designed to counter eavesdropping and replay attacks [1] . The success of S/KEY stems from its efficiency and simplicity as well as its security property. S/KEY uses simple hash functions and does not require other complex cryptographic primitives. Even though S/KEY is immune to eavesdropping and replay attacks, it is susceptible to preplay attacks and off-line dictionary attacks. Hence, Yeh, Shen, and Hwang recently proposed a secure one-time password authentication scheme using smart cards, which they claimed to be secure against preplay attacks and off-line dictionary attacks [2] . However, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to preplay attacks. Specifically, the attacker can successfully launch preplay attacks just after eavesdropping two executions of the protocol.
Review of Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's Scheme
This review of Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's scheme is from [2] . As the S/KEY scheme, there are three stages in Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's scheme: a registration stage, a login stage, and an authentication stage.
In a registration stage, a user and a server set up a unique seed value S EED and the number of login times N. If N is 100, the user can login the server 100 times and the server updates a counter to store the remaining login times. After setting up S EED and N, the user computes an initial operation.
Conceptually, a login stage and an authentication stage can be considered as a single stage. For the t-th login, the server sends the user challenging values using a random number D t , a hash value H(D t ), the pre-shared secret S EED and a stored value p t−1 . After validating the challenge, the user sends p t ⊕ D t as a response. Finally, the server checks the response and replaces the stored value p t−1 with p t .
Registration Stage
Initially, the server issues a smart card containing a preshared secret S EED to the user, where S EED is a large random number generated by the server. Then, the server generates a random number 
Login Stage
User ← Server: 
Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's scheme consists of three steps: eavesdropping, impersonation of the server, and impersonation of the user.
In the eavesdropping step, the attacker records messages between the server and the user in the t-th and the t + 1-th login stages. By using recorded messages, the attacker impersonates the server to launch a preplay attack. After receiving a response from the user, the attacker can successfully impersonate the user in the t + 2-th login stage.
STEP 1: Eavesdropping
The attacker records communicational tokens in the t-th and the t + 1-th login stages.
STEP 2: Impersonation of the server By using recorded tokens in STEP 1, the attacker computes the following fake tokens for the t + 2-th login stage.
With these tokens, the attacker plays the server's role for the t + 2-th stage. The tokens are valid for the t + 2-th stage except that D t+1 is the previously used random number in the t + 1-th stage. Since, the user does not store the previous random numbers, he is unable to find out that the tokens are forged and thinks the attacker is a valid server.
STEP 3: Impersonation of the user At this point, the attacker tries to login the server in the t +2-th stage. After receiving the server's challenge, the attacker computes the response as follows:
where
Since the attacker's response U t+2 is exactly the same as the expected response to the server's challenge, the attacker is accepted as a valid user. Hence, the attacker succeeds in a preplay attack.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we showed that a preplay attack can overcome Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's scheme. A countermeasure of this attack is for the user to store all previous random values. However, this remedy cannot guarantee the security of Yeh, Shen, and Hwang's scheme, since our attack is merely an example of many attack scenarios. Hence, we recommend that protocol designers employ formal security proof techniques such as [3] - [5] .
